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I  INTRODUCTION  
A  controversial  issue  discussed  in  the  literature  is  whether  foreign  aid  leads  to 
increasing  economic  growth  in  recipient  countries  (see  e.g.  Hudson,  2004:  185-6). 
Rather unambiguous is, however, the scholarly debate on whether economic freedom is 
favorable  for  economic  growth.  Current  literature  on  economic  development  finds 
positive correlation between economic freedom and economic development (see e.g. 
Miles et al., 2005: 18, Powell and Ryan, 2005, and De Haan, 2003) and also suggests 
that  economic  freedom  is  a  precondition  for  economic  development  (Pasicolan  and 
Fitzgerald,  2002:  7-8).  If  this  relationship  holds  then,  to  promote  economic  growth, 
foreign aid should increase, or at least not negatively affect, economic freedom within 
the  recipient  country.  Otherwise  economic  growth  initiated  by  aid,  e.g.  via  the 
investment channel, could be interfered with by negative effects of aid on economic 
freedom. However, the literature indicates that at least some forms of foreign aid act 
system preserving and support rent seeking behavior. The discussion is linked to the 
‘curse of natural resources’ debate and in this respect, research indicates that foreign aid, 
as well as natural resources have a negative impact on democracy (Djankov et al., 2005: 
8-17). 
Thus the objective of the present study is to examine whether different forms of foreign 
aid affect economic freedom and, therefore, economic growth in recipient countries. 
Answers are sought mainly to the question whether overall foreign aid and conditional 
support promote or impede economic freedom. To examine this, panel analysis is used 
with the “Heritage Index of Economic Freedom” as dependent variable and “official 
development assistance” and “IMF credit” as independent variables, while controlling 
for other variables considered of importance in the literature. 
Previous research on economics of aid found that unconditional foreign aid is, if not 
utterly insignificant, negatively correlated with economic freedom (see e.g. Vásquez, 
1998: 279). Conditional support, however, as in the case of IMF credit, is found to 
increase economic freedom and is therefore regarded as more successful in supporting 
economic development (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003: 637-47).1 However, whilst these 
previous studies usually refer either to official development assistance or to support by 
international financial institutions (e.g. International Monetary Fund) this study includes 
both  variables  to  examine  the  relationship  between  economic  freedom  and different 
forms of foreign aid at the same time. Furthermore, contrary to previous studies, which 
usually use the Economic Freedom Index provided by the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney 
and  Lawson,  2005),  in  this  study  the  Economic  Freedom  Index  from  the  Heritage 
Foundation is used.2 This index is, in many respects, similar to the Economic Freedom 
                                                 
1  Boockmann and Dreher (2003) find that the number of programs, not the amount of credit increases 
economic freedom.  
2  The data is available at www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm.  
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Index by the Fraser Institute but it has the advantage of being available at an annual 
basis.3 
Section 2 discusses the relationship between economic growth and freedom and how 
foreign  aid  might  influence  economic  freedom.  Section  3  describes  the  estimation 
method and data used and presents and discusses empirical results. The summary and 
discussion of the findings are presented in the final part of the paper. 
II  INTERRELATIONS  BETWEEN  AID,  ECONOMIC  FREEDOM  AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
One  of  the  overarching objectives  of  foreign  aid  is,  beside  emergency  aid  as  is  for 
example given in case of a starvation disaster, to stimulate economic growth of recipient 
countries.  However,  despite  of  a large amount of foreign aid flowing to developing 
countries  over  the  years,  recipient  countries  usually  remained  poor  or  even  became 
poorer (UNDP, 1996: 1). Especially in the 1990s in respect to aid enthusiasm amongst 
donors declined (Hudson, 2004: 185) along with the extent of aid flows (see e.g. Collier 
and Dollar, 2004: 244, and Addison et al., 2005: 991-6 for aid volumes to Sub-Saharan 
Africa).  This  observation  let  economists  to  rethink  whether  and  under  what 
circumstances foreign aid stimulates growth. Empirical literature discussed this issue 
quite extensively in recent years. In a nutshell, the early strand of empirical literature 
indicates  that  aid  has  a positive  effect  on  growth  (e.g.  Papanek,  1972).  However, a 
second strand of literature questions these findings. For example, Mosley et al. (1987) 
and Boone (1996) find no relationship between aid and growth for developing countries; 
it is rather the case that aid increases the size of governments. The most recent strands 
of literature, however, suggest that aid is growth enhancing when it meets a favorable 
environment in the recipient countries (see e.g. Addison et al., 2005 for a literature 
overview).4 
An important element of such a favorable environment seems to be an encouraging 
economic climate or in other words, a market system based on economic freedom. The 
empirical literature indicates that economic freedom is positively related to economic 
growth. For example Scully and Slottje (1991), De Vanssay and Spindler (1994), Islam 
(1996), Hanke and Walters (1997), Easton and Walker (1997), Dawson (1998), and 
Heckelman and Stroup (2000) find that economic freedom is positively related to the 
level  of  economic  development  and  economic  growth.5  However,  De  Haan  (2003) 
                                                 
3  The economic freedom index provided by the Fraser Institute is available at five-year frequency until 
2000; only after 2000 it is available at annual frequency (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2005). For a 
comparison of these two indicators see e.g. De Haan and Sturm (2000) and Hanke and Walters (1997). 
4   Some current articles again question this finding and focus on absorptive capacity (see Loots, 2006). 
5  See for a literature overview De Haan (2003).  
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points out that these studies usually do not consider all relevant estimation problems. He 
also notes that studies which include these considerations find only a positive change of 
economic freedom is related to economic growth (De Haan and Sturm, 2000, Sturm and 
De Haan, 2001, and Pitlik, 2002). 
These findings, especially that aid can be growth enhancing when it meets a favorable 
environment and that a positive change in freedom is growth enhancing, suggest that the 
relationship between aid and economic freedom is relevant for economic growth. The 
question arising in particular is how aid may influence economic freedom, and thus 
economic growth. 
The literature on aid and economic freedom identifies different transmission paths of aid 
on economic freedom and growth. On the positive side aid can be a means of growth 
enhancing  public  investment,  which  could  stimulate  additional  private  capital  flows 
towards  developing  countries.  Public  investment  based  on  foreign  aid  is  financed 
without the need to tax domestic citizens and can, therefore, increase economic freedom 
(Powell and Ryan, 2005: 13, Vásquez, 1998: 277). The little empirical evidence there is 
for economic freedom enhancing foreign aid is reasoned for by various claims which try 
not only to explain why aid impulses do not translate into increased economic freedom, 
but also why foreign aid may lead to a reduction of economic freedom. The channels of 
explanation include the use of aid for neither freedom nor growth enhancing policy, 
such  as  the  increase  of  public  consumption  or  financing  of  projects  preferred  by 
domestic governments instead of investment (Vásquez, 1998: 278) and the characteristic 
of aid to increase the size and scope of governments – absolutely and relative to private 
sector (Powell and Ryan, 2005: 2, 13). The reduced need for domestic taxation leads to 
a  reduced  pressure  for  policy  reform  (Collier  and  Dollar,  2004:  262-3).  It  is  also 
identified in the literature that aid may negatively harm economic freedom because of 
the specific provision of foreign aid by donor countries. Thus, aid seems to be mainly 
distributed  to  countries  whose  governments  maintain  growth-thwarting  policies 
(Vásquez,  1998:  278)  and  leads  to  propping  up  of  institutions  resisting  economic 
liberalization (Hanke and Walters, 1997: 144, Powell and Ryan, 2005: 11). Therefore, 
the expectance of aid may lead to reduced efforts of liberal reform and to a reduction of 
pre-cautionary measures (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003: 636, Collier and Dollar, 2004: 
257).6 Accordingly, Hanke and Walters (1997: 144) conclude that foreign aid is not a 
necessary condition for economic growth and Powell and Ryan (2005: 2) even state that 
aid  is  an  “anti-market  force”  which  leads  to  “expulsion  of  productive  groups, 
suppression of private trade, restriction of the inflow of foreign capital, confiscation of 
property,  forced  collectivization,  takeover  of  foreign  enterprises,  discouragement  of 
agriculture,  support  of  unviable  projects,  and import substitution.” This leads to the 
conclusion that overall aid reduces economic freedom. 
                                                 
6  For example Knack (2001) finds that aid is positively correlated with corruption.   
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The long-lasting debate of aid effectiveness led to two possible measures, selective and 
conditional aid7, which may reduce the negative effects of aid on economic freedom and 
growth, while not abandoning the potential benefits from foreign aid. This paper focuses 
on conditional support in comparison to overall aid, while selective aid, where countries 
have to meet preconditions before qualifying for donor support, will not be included in 
the empirical analysis due to a lack of data. Conditional support has the advantage that 
specific  agreed  upon  policy  measures  can  be  implemented  which  directly  increase 
economic freedom. Besides this direct effect, conditional support could stimulate private 
capital flows as it could work as a kind of official approval of a positive economic 
environment  (Vásquez,  1998:  282).  Other  potentially  indirect  effects  of  conditional 
support are listed by Boockmann and Dreher (2003: 635) and include the negotiation 
process with donors potentially leading to political advantages of pro-market reform 
politicians, the involvement of civil society possibly encouraging a liberal consensus, a 
lack of reform capacity in developing countries may be overcome by welcome advice, 
reform programs which underlie conditional support can be improved in their efficiency 
by learning from recipients countries experience, and that complementary training may 
enhance  domestic  capacities  to  reform.  These  potential  advantages  of  conditional 
support  are,  however,  questioned  by  the  argument  that  promises  about  reforms  are 
seldom  kept  (Hudson,  2004:  188)  and  that,  from  an  institutional  perspective,  even 
lenders, i.e. development agencies, are not interested in proper reforms, which would 
make them obsolete (Vásquez, 1998: 282). However, since the arguments against the 
effective use of conditional support do not indicate that conditional support would be 
more harmful than unconditional aid and since there are arguments that the positive 
effects  of  aid  can  be  better  ensured  if  conditions  are  in  place,  we  conclude  that 
conditional support is expected to yield better results with regard to economic freedom. 
The discussion of conditional support versus overall aid leads to two hypotheses: Firstly, 
overall  aid  reduces  economic  freedom.  Secondly,  conditional  support  increases 
economic freedom. 
III   TESTING  THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  ECONOMIC  FREEDOM  AND 
AID 
1. Data and method 
The first issue with regard to the empirical analysis of the relationship between aid and 
economic freedom is the decision of which available data can appropriately measure 
economic freedom. There exist two indices for this purpose: the Economic Freedom 
                                                 
7  For a discussion see e.g. Hudson (2004: 188).  
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Index of the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.8  
Both indices try to include the whole range of government activities which are related to 
economic  freedom  and  market  friendliness,  e.g.  property  rights,  and  freedom  of 
transaction. Although both indices are somewhat different in their methodology, e.g. the 
Fraser index consist of 23 components classified in five core components (Gwartney 
and  Lawson,  2005)  whilst  the  Heritage  Foundation  index  consist  of  50  components 
classified in ten core components (Beach and Miles, 2006: 56), a comparison by Hanke 
and Walters (1997) indicates that their results are comparable and similar; both indices 
are highly correlated with each other (ibid.: 135-6). However, both indices have some 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The Fraser index is available from 1970 to 2003, however not for all years and not for 
all countries. The first draw in 1970 contains data for 53 countries, after that the index is 
available at five-year intervals extended successively by further countries until 2000. 
Since then the index is available on an annual basis and contains information for 123 
countries.  The  advantage  is  that  the  index  allows  comparison  for  more  than  three 
decades.  In  contrast,  the  advantage  of  the  Heritage  Foundation  index  is  that  it  is 
available on an annual basis however only for a shorter time period, from 1995 to 2006. 
Furthermore,  it  is  also  available  for  some  140  countries  for  nearly  the  whole  time 
period.9 
To serve the purpose of our study the Heritage Foundation index seems to be more 
favorable  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  in  terms  of  time  period,  the  shorter  availability 
seems not to be disturbing. The advantage of the use of more current data is that the 
regime switch in development policy and the abolition of communist regimes in the 
1990s which led to structural breaks is not interfering (see Collier and Dollar, 2004: 
244), hence the use of the time period from 1995 onwards seems to be favorable to 
capture the actual influence of development aid on economic freedom. Secondly, the 
annual availability of the Heritage Foundation index matches better with the frequency 
of  the  independent  variables.  Thirdly,  in  terms  of  the  number  of  observations  the 
Heritage Foundation is superior. In particular it includes a higher number of countries 
and is available on an annual basis. Hence, the Heritage Foundation index is used. The 
core components of this index are: trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, 
monetary policy, capital flows, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, 
regulation, and informal market activity. For a description of the contents of the core 
components see annex 1. The index decreases with increasing economic freedom. 
                                                 
8  Another  index  is  provided  by  the  Freedom  House,  however  this  index  rather  measures  political 
freedom  and  civil  liberties,  than  economic  freedom  (see  e.g.  Hanke  and  Walters  1997  and 
http://www.freedomhouse.org). 
9  It started in 1995 with information for 106 countries and extended the countries included already in 
1996 to a number of 143 countries. In 2005 it is available for 159 countries.  
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The second issue to be considered is which available data can be employed to test the 
hypotheses with regard to conditional support and overall aid. As a measure for overall 
aid we use the aid per capita data provided by the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, which are calculated from OECD data of aid flows including both, Official 
Development  Assistance  (ODA)  and  Official  Aid  (OA),10  and  from  World  Bank’s 
population data. Both measures of aid meet the same specifications, e.g. they bear a 
grant  element  of  at  least  25  percent.  Official  development  assistance  is  provided  in 
various different frames: unconditional, conditional, and selective aid; therefore it is 
regarded as appropriate approximation for overall aid. As a measure for conditional 
support  we  use  IMF  disbursements  to  member  countries  per  capita  generated  from 
original  IMF  data  about  countries’  transactions  with  the  fund  and  World  Banks 
Population data. IMF transactions are not included in the overall aid, since they do not 
bear a grant element. All forms of IMF disbursement are conditional (see IMF, 2005). 
The  conditionality  of  IMF  credit  is  implemented  by  a  letter  of  intent  in  which  the 
recipient countries spell out plans to reform. The first tranche is usually disbursed on 
this  promise,  while  further  tranches  are  disbursed  after  observing  progress  in  the 
fulfillment of the conditions. The general objective of IMF conditionality is to resolve a 
country’s  balance  of  payments  difficulties  by  policy  measures  which  address  the 
underlying structural problems. Examples can be found in the reduction of public debt 
and the liberalization of prices and trade which can be generally regarded as economic 
freedom enhancing. Therefore, IMF disbursements are regarded as best available data 
for conditional support. 
With respect to the availability of these variables our sample consists of 104 countries 
covering the years 1995 to 2004. The selection includes countries for which data of the 
Heritage Economic Freedom Index is available and which received aid in the period of 
observation. To get a first impression on the data, table 1 presents some descriptive 
statistics. 
                                                 
10 There is no difference between ODA and OA other than that ODA is directed towards “traditional” 
developing countries (included in part I of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
list), while OA is directed towards more advanced and transition economies (included in part II of the 
DAC list) (OECD, 2006a and 2006b).  
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Table 1: Development of economic freedom, aid, and IMF disbursements in the sample 
Year 
Variable 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Mean  3.28  3.32  3.27  3.23  3.20  3.20  3.16  3.13  3.09  3.08 




Growth rate [in %]    1.4  -1.5  -1.1  -1.0  -0.1  -1.3  -0.8  -1.2  -0.5 
Total [in billion US $]  43.3  39.3  33.5  36.1  37.9  34.7  36.3  38.0  38.5   
Aid   
Growth rate [in %]    -9.3  -14.7  7.7  4.9  -8.3  4.5  4.6  1.5   
Total [in billion US $]  27.0  8.2  23.0  28.5  14.5  9.7  31.0  33.4  29.1  6.4  IMF 
disbursements   Growth rate [in %]    -69.6  180.7  23.8  -49.2  -32.8  218.4  7.7  -12.8  -77.9 
Source: Heritage Foundation, World Bank, and IMF; own calculations. 
As shown in table 1 economic freedom of the sample countries as measured by the 
Heritage Foundation seems to increase since 1996. The average score of the countries 
decreased from 3.32 in 1996 to 3.08 in 2004, which indicates an increase in economic 
freedom. Similarly the standard deviation decreased which indicates that the differences 
between the countries considered declined. In contrast the total sum of aid received by 
the sample countries shows no uniform picture. From 1995 to 1997 the flow of aid 
decreased dramatically from 43.3 billion US dollar to 33.5 billion US dollar. After that 
decrease the extent of aid flow increased slightly resulting in another slump in 2000. 
However, the amount of aid seems to be more or less constant since 1999 with a sum of 
around 38 billion US dollar. Whilst the extent of aid seems to be constant this is not the 
case for IMF disbursements. The figures clearly indicate that IMF disbursements are 
high in time of a crisis and low otherwise, and that they show an overall increasing 
trend. 
To  examine  the  effect  of  aid  on  economic  freedom  empirically  we  use  GLS  panel 
estimation. The simple model specification to test whether overall aid and conditional 
support effects the change of economic freedom is as follows: 
DFREEit = a + ß1AIDit + ß2IMFit + ui + εit      (1) 
where  DFREEit  is  the  year  to  year  change  of  the  value  of  the  Heritage  Economic 
Freedom Index of a country, AIDit is the extent of official development assistance per 
capita, IMFit is the amount of IMF credit per capita a country received in the respective 
year, a is a constant term, and ui + εit is treated as an error term consisting of two 
components,  a  country  specific  component  which  does  not  vary  over  time,  and  a 
remainder component which is assumed to be uncorrelated over time. 
A standard issue in panel data econometrics is whether to employ a random or a fixed 
estimation model. In our case the Hausman test does not argue against the use of a 
random  effects  model  therefore  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  individual  effects  are  
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uncorrelated  with  the  other  regressors,  and  a  random  effects  model  seems  to  be 
appropriate. 
Another concern with regard to the above mentioned model specification is that this 
simple  model  design  may  not  be  exhaustive  in  explaining  the  change  in  economic 
freedom. That is, the simple regression model should be recalculated under control of 
other variables. Because of the lack of a theoretical model which explains the impacts 
on  economic  freedom  we  are  considering  various  variables  used  in  the  empirical 
literature so far. Determinants that might influence changes of economic freedom in a 
country might be GDP per capita growth, macroeconomic shocks such as declines of 
GDP per capita growth rates of 5 percent points, changes in the terms of trade, terms of 
trade shocks such as a 5 percent deterioration in terms of trade indices, changes in the 
political  system  indicated  by  a  political  rights  index,  the  primary  commodity 
dependence measured as the share of fuel exports as percent of total exports, as well as 
the  level  of  human  ability  to  stand  in  for  economic  freedom  measured  by  school 
enrolment indicators.11 Various other measures that would be regarded as important for 
economic freedom in a general theoretical model, such as the level of corruption, must 
be excluded from the set of independent variables since they are part of the economic 
freedom  index  of  the  Heritage  Foundation.  This  reflexts  a  fundamental  problem  of 
empirically  dealing  with  composit  indicators:  The  estimation  of  a  fully  specified 
theoretical model is not possible due to the empirical inability to explain a variable be 
components of itself. The full estimation model is: 
DFREEit =  a + ß1AIDit + ß2IMFit + ß3GDP_PC_GROit + ß4GDP_SHOCK_DUMit  
+ ß5POL_RIGHTS_CHAit + ß6FUEL_EXPit + ß7TOT_CHAit  
+ ß8TOT_SHOCK_DUMit + ß9SCHOOL_ENROLit + ui + εit     (2) 
We start our estimation procedure by estimating the core model, which is then extended 
by  other  explanatory  variables  to  evaluate  their  influence  on  the  results  of  the  core 
model. To test the robustness of the results we conduct the same procedure for two sub-
samples. Finally, as part of the discussion of the results we conduct a level estimation of 
economic  freedom,  to  detect  possible  selection  differences  between  IMF  support 
countries and overall aid reception countries. 
                                                 
11 Similar Boockmann and Dreher (2003) use data for school enrolment and export figures; Collier and 
Dollar (2004: 251) stress the importance of macroeconomic and terms of trade shocks; De Haan and 
Sturm (2003) emphasise the importance of political rights for economic freedom. All data used here is 
drawn or based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators, except for the political right index, 
which  is  taken  from  Freedom  House  (2006).  A  review  of  the  correlation  matrix  indicates  no 
multicollinearity between all variables considered.  
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2. Empirical results 
The  results  of  the  various  estimations  are  reported  in  table  2.  Since  the  economic 
freedom  index  is  a  composite  index  consisting  also  of  qualitative  variables,  the 
coefficients  indicating  the  quantitative  relationships  between  the  dependent  and 
independent  variables  are  difficult  to  interpret.  We  are,  therefore,  restricting  the 
discussion  to  the  signs  and  significance  of  the  results,  while  still  reporting  the 
coefficients. 
Table 2: Estimation results on changes in the Economic Freedom Index (whole sample) 
  Dependent variable: Annual change in economic freedom 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 



































GDP, pc growth    -0.0007              0.0005 
GDP shock dummy      -0.0217            -0.0072 
Pol. rights, change        0.0139          0.0046 
Fuel exports          0.0003        0.0000 
ToT, change            0.0340      0.0935 
ToT shock dummy              -0.0174    0.0043 
School enrolment                -0.0002  -0.0001 














-0.0032  -0.0015 
No. of countries  104  102  104  103  101  72  72  102  63 
No. of observations  807  792  803  799  663  461  461  435  233 
Prob > χ
2  0.0084  0.0188  0.0130  0.0116  0.0018  0.0537  0.0477  0.0077  0.5468 
* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
The estimation of the core model yields a surprising result; while the coefficient of 
overall  aid  is  significantly  negative;  the  coefficient  of  IMF  credit  is  significant  and 
positive.  The  economic  freedom  index  increases  with  lower  economic  freedom;  a 
positive change of the index indicates therefore less economic freedom. Accordingly, a 
positive coefficient of the IMF credit measure indicates that a positive amount of IMF 
credit transferred to a country is related to decreasing economic freedom. The Wald χ
2 
test  statistic  shows  the  estimation  model  as  having  advantages  over  a  pure  random 
model and can be interpreted. Thus, from the estimation of the core model we could 
conclude  that  the  first  hypothesis,  overall  aid  decreases  economic  freedom,  can  be  
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rejected and the second hypothesis, IMF credit enhances economic freedom, can also be 
rejected. Since one can argue that the impact of the IMF conditionality and aid acts 
retarded we re-estimated the model with lagged variables (up to three years), however, 
this  does  not  change  the  results.  However,  before  drawing  conclusions  we  consider 
seven other possible explanatory variables. 
The growth rate of per capita GDP is an indicator for economic development. If positive 
economic development were positively related with economic freedom we would expect 
a significant negative coefficient. The second row in table 2 reports a negative but non-
significant coefficient, which is not interfering with the coefficients of the core model. 
We conclude that the variable adds no value to the estimation and drop it again. 
The inclusion of a dummy variable for GDP growth shocks is the next step. We consider 
the variable as important because it can be argued that the negative impact of IMF credit 
on economic freedom could simply result from the fact that credit is only provided in 
times of serious economic trouble. Thus, the crisis may reduce economic freedom and it 
is  therefore  not  the  IMF  support,  which  is  provided  at  the  same  time,  impeding 
economic freedom. The variable (1 for differences in growth rates of minus five percent 
points or less, 0 for all other cases) becomes insignificant (see row 3 in table 2). We 
conclude from this estimation that the IMF credit variable in the core model does not 
show  a  positive  sign  because  of  an  unobserved  negative  effect  of  macroeconomic 
shocks on economic freedom. 
In the fourth estimation we include a variable that measures the change of the political 
rights index of the Freedom House. We are arguing that political freedom may be linked 
with economic freedom and positive changes in one index may be related to positive 
changes  of  the  other.  The  estimation  shows  a  positive  coefficient  which  remains, 
however, not significant. The inclusion of the variable does not change the significance 
of the core model and does not add value to the explanatory power of the core model. 
In a further estimation (see row 6) we include a changes-in-terms-of-trade variable. The 
idea behind the inclusion is that a favorable foreign trade positions, e.g. increases in the 
terms  of  trade,  may  result  in  less  opposition  against  trade  liberalization  and  may 
therefore lead to increased trade openness and economic freedom. The estimation results 
in an insignificant coefficient for the terms of trade variable. 
We then construct a terms of trade shock variable indicating a drop in the countries’ 
terms of trade index of at least 10 percent. We consider this variable as being of interest 
since the IMF may react on a balance of payment crises, which may consist of economic 
freedom decreasing because governments restrict the freedom of trade due to crises. The 
inclusion of the variable may, therefore, capture a so far undetected effect borne by the 
IMF credit measure. The estimation shows a negative sign of the coefficient, just as in 
the case of the GDP shock dummy, but it also remains insignificant. The significance of  
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the core model remains. We conclude that the coefficient of the IMF credit variable is 
not overlaid by a terms of trade shock effect. 
Finally we include a school enrolment variable to capture the capacity of a society to 
understand the advantages of the abstract concept of economic freedom and to articulate 
the will to demand economic freedom (see row 8). We test various measures of school 
enrolment. Gross secondary school enrolment yields the best fitting results, however 
still not significant at a 10 percent level. 
We then estimate a model including all potentially explanatory variables (see row 9), 
which  leads  to  reduced  explanatory  power  compared  to  the  core  model.  We  then 
undertake  estimations  with  various  combinations  of  the  explanatory  variables  (not 
reported in table 2) without being able to increase the power of the estimation compared 
to  the  core  model.  As  a  final  point  we  conduct  a  Wald  χ
2  test  on  the  combined 
significance of the variables we added to the core model. The probability of 0.9959 does 
not allow concluding that the additional variables would add value to the core model.  
The results of the estimation models presented in table 2 can be summarised as follows: 
First, aid per capita is positively correlated with economic freedom. Second, IMF credit 
shows  significant positive signs in all estimation models and is therefore negatively 
correlated  with  economic  freedom.  Other  variables  are  insignificant  and  their 
interrelation with economic freedom can hardly be interpreted. 
3. Robustness tests and test for endogeneity 
Before we draw conclusions regarding the hypotheses and interpret the results we are 
testing  the  robustness of the results by conducting the same exercise with two sub-
samples. The first includes the 24 sub-Sahara African countries of the sample, one of the 
least developed region in the world. The second includes all countries but only data 
from  2000  onwards.  The  main  findings  of  the  estimations  of  the  whole  model  are 
verified by the results of the sub-sample estimations (see table 3). The model including 
the limited time frame confirms the results of the above analysis, aid is positively and 
IMF credit is negatively correlated with economic freedom. The core model of the sub-
Sahara African sub-sample leads to insignificant results regarding the aid variable, while 
IMF credit has a significant negative impact on economic freedom in African countries 
too. 
The literature (e.g. Heckelman and Knack, 2005: 9) discuses that aid variables may be 
potentially  endogenous  because  aid  flows  may  depend  on  economic  freedom  in  the 
recipient countries. To test for endogeneity we construct instrument variables for IMF 
credit as well as for aid. As instruments we use the lagged variables as well as highly 
correlated  variables  from  our  database.  We  employ  general  two  stage  least  square 
estimation procedure for panel data with random effects. We then use a Durbin Wu 
Hausman test to test for systematic differences in the coefficients. The null hypothesis of  
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no systematic differences cannot be rejected for the IMF credit case and the aid case 
using both lagged data and other highly correlated variables as instruments. Thus, we 
conclude that endogeneity is not a problem in our above described estimation procedure. 
Table 3: Estimation results on changes in the Economic freedom Index (sub-samples) 
  Dependent variable: Annual change in economic freedom 
  Sub-Sahara African sub-sample  2000-2004 sub-sample 
Aid, pc  -0.0005  -0.0006*** 
IMF, pc  0.0098**  0.0007*** 
Constant  -0.0359  -0.0125 
No. of countries  24  104 
No. of observations  186  416 
Prob > χ
2  0.0566  0.0005 
* significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, *** significant at 1 percent level. 
4. Discussion of the results 
After considering various explanatory variables in extension of the core model and after 
testing the robustness of the results by conducting sub-sample estimations, we can now 
conclude that the first impression following from the estimation of the core model is 
persistent. 
The hypothesis which claims overall aid to be decreasing economic freedom can be 
rejected. The estimations indicate that aid flows are negatively correlated to changes in 
the Economic Freedom Index. 
The second hypothesis, that IMF credit is economic freedom enhancing can be rejected. 
The results of the estimation indicate that financial IMF support is economic freedom 
decreasing. This result is robust to changes of samples. It is also evident from the above 
analysis  that  IMF  credit is  worse  than  overall  aid  regarding the effect on economic 
freedom. 
The  estimation  results  raise  two  questions:  why  IMF  credit  has  negative  effects  on 
economic  freedom  and  why  IMF  credit  is  less  favorable  than  overall  aid.  The  first 
question  could  be  answered  by  blaming  the  negative  effects  of  conditioned  aid,  as 
outlined in section 2 to IMF credit, and by arguing that the imposed conditions are 
seldom fulfilled. We could also blame all the negative effects of unconditioned aid to 
explain  the  negative  impacts  of  IMF  credit  on  economic  freedom.  What  we  cannot  
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explain by these claims is why IMF credit is less favorable than aid. We are therefore 
returning to the data to bring some light in the dark.12 
As stated above and documented in annex 1, the economic freedom index is constructed 
of  10  sub-categories  of  economic  freedom.  In  order  to  find  out  how  IMF  credit  is 
affecting  the  different  sub-categories  we  use  a  sub-sample  of  observations in which 
cases a positive amount of IMF credit meet an increasing economic freedom index. The 
sub-sample comprises of 106 observations. Which sub-categories are worsening in the 
respective periods in the respective countries is reported in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Cases of sub-category worsening in the IMF credit and positive economic 
freedom index change cases 

























Source: Heritage Foundation; own calculation. 
The figure shows the fiscal burden sub-category being of outstanding importance for the 
worsening of the economic freedom index in the cases of IMF credit. While all other 
categories are worsening in less than a third of the cases, the fiscal burden worsens 
economic  freedom  in  more  than  half  of  the  cases.  The  fiscal  burden  sub-category 
comprises three measures: the top marginal income tax rate, the top marginal corporate 
tax rate, and the year-to-year change in government expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
The first two of these measures may be affected by IMF conditionality, which usually 
includes  a  fiscal  tightening  to  reduce  government  debt.  It  seems  that  the  fiscal 
consolidation is undertaken in most of the cases by increasing taxes instead of reducing 
spending.13 Expenditure may also not be reduced because of the availability of resources 
provided by IMF credit. At the same time, shrinking GDP, caused by an IMF support-
                                                 
12 Another idea was to test whether IMF credit and aid are distributed differently between countries with 
different degrees of freedom. Therefore, we regressed aid per capita and IMF credit per capita on the 
level of the economic freedom variable. We found no significant result, which could provide evidence 
for a different distribution.  
13 Boockmann and Dreher (2003: 646) state that IMF credit go hand in hand with increasing taxes.  
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raising crisis, leads to increasing figures of expenditure per GDP even if spending is 
constant  or  slightly  shrinking.  Thus,  the  negative  effect  of  IMF  credit  on  the  fiscal 
burden  measure  of  the  Heritage  index  is  comprehensible.  This  negative  effect  tops 
possible positive effects of IMF conditionality on other sub-categories of the Freedom 
index and leads to the overall negative impact on the economic freedom index. 
IV  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the interdependences between overall aid and IMF credit, as measure for 
conditional  support  on  the  one  side  and  economic  freedom  on  the  other  side 
demonstrates clearly that the introduction of conditions on aid does not increase the 
economic  freedom,  as  measured  by  the  economic  freedom  index,  in  aid  receiving 
countries. It can be concluded that the postulation of post-drawing conditions has not 
been  helpful  in  order  to  increase  economic  freedom,  as  measured  by  the  economic 
freedom index, during the period of observation. If the aforementioned positive relation 
between  the  economic  freedom  index  and  economic  growth  holds,  then  conditional 
support was just as little helpful to initiate growth processes.  
However,  we  are  also  concluding  that  the  effect  of  conditional  IMF  credit  on  the 
economic  freedom  index  is  concentrated  on  one  specific  sub-category  of  the  index, 
namely the fiscal burden. This category includes measures for tax rates as well as for 
public spending in relation to GDP. If one of the conditions of IMF support would be 
fiscal consolidation and if countries would fulfill this condition by increasing taxes and 
not by reducing expenditure, then the condition will lead to less economic freedom, as 
measured by the index. In the index of the Heritage Foundation the positive effect of 
such a policy, that is to say the reduction of public deficits or even debt, is not defined 
as increasing economic freedom. It could be argued however that such a policy could 
increase  economic  freedom,  e.g.  by  less  public  competition  on  credit  markets.  This 
condition is aimed to increase economic stability rather than economic freedom and is 
responsible for the overall negative impression of conditional IMF support because it 
excels other freedom enhancing conditions such as the demand to liberalise prices and 
foreign trade. This is also due to the specific weights of the sub-categories in the index. 
Thus, we cannot conclude from the effect of the IMF credit on the economic freedom 
index that the IMF conditions do not contribute to a favorable economic environment, 
although the index suggests it. 
Therefore further research should evaluate other variations of aid, such as selective aid, 
which is only provided if pre-conditions are fulfilled and other forms of conditional aid 
with conditions on public spending instead of conditions on public deficits. 
Assuming,  as  stated  initially,  that  IMF  credit  is  an  appropriate  approximation  for 
conditional support and that the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation is 
an  appropriate  approximation  for  economic  freedom,  we  must  conclude  that  the  
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establishment  of  conditions  of  the  international  donor  community  cannot  force 
economic freedom in developing countries.  
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Annex 1: Components of the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 
Area  Core components  Contents 
I  Trade policy   Weighted average tariff rate 
Non-tariff barriers 
Corruption in the custom service 
II  Fiscal burden of 
government 
Top marginal income tax rate 
Top marginal corporate tax rate 
Year-to-year change in government expenditures as a percent of GDP 
III  Government intervention 
in the economy 
Government consumption as a percentage of the economy 
Government ownership of businesses and industries 
Share  of  government  revenues  from  state-owned  enterprises  and  government 
ownership of property 
Economic output produced by the government 
IV  Monetary policy  Weighted average inflation rate from 1995 to 2004 
V  Capital flows and foreign 
investment 
Foreign investment code 
Restrictions on foreign ownership of business 
Restrictions on industries and companies open to foreign investors 
Restrictions and performance requirements on foreign companies 
Foreign ownership of land 
Equal treatment under the law for both foreign 
and domestic companies 
Restrictions on repatriation of earnings 
Restrictions on capital transactions 
Availability of local financing for foreign companies 
VI  Banking and finance  Government ownership of financial institutions 
Restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries 
Government influence over the allocation of credit 
Government regulations that inhibit financial activity 
Freedom to offer all types of financial services, securities, and insurance policies 
VII  Wages and prices  Minimum wage laws 
Freedom to set prices privately without government influence 
Government price controls 
Extent to which government price controls are used 
Government subsidies to businesses that affect prices 
VIII  Property rights  Freedom from government influence over the judicial system 
Commercial code defining contracts 
Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes 
Government expropriation of property 
Corruption within the judiciary 
Delays in receiving judicial decisions and/or enforcement 
Legally granted and protected private property 
VIIII  Regulation  Licensing requirements to operate a business 
Ease of obtaining a business license 
Corruption within the bureaucracy 
Labor regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental 
leave, as well as selected labor regulations 
Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations 
Regulations that impose a burden on business 
X  Informal market activity  Smuggling 
Piracy of intellectual property in the informal market 
Agricultural production supplied on the informal market 
Manufacturing supplied on the informal market 
Services supplied on the informal market 
Transportation supplied on the informal market 
Labor supplied on the informal market 
Source: Beach and Miles (2006: 58-74). 